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Abstract
Prior studies on capital investments, including mergers and acquisitions, point to investment
irreversibility as the primary factor behind diminished investments during periods of increased policy
uncertainty. We show that increased relational risk, due to the potential for counterparty misbehavior
or shirking and higher contracting costs, appears to be the primary driver behind the diminished
propensity to undertake strategic alliances during enhanced policy uncertainty regimes. Alliances are
even less likely during such times when they (a) involve more than two firms, (b) are in industries with
greater counterparty risk, and (c) involve partners that require intense contracts.
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1. Introduction
Strategic alliances1 have gained increasing prominence in the corporate landscape and now
occupy a central place in corporate decision-making. Nevin (2014) notes that “strategic alliances are
sweeping through nearly every industry and are becoming an essential driver of superior growth. The
value of alliance is estimated to reach $30 trillion to $50 trillion in the next five years (p. 212).” A
recent comprehensive white paper by KPMG's global strategy group emphasizes the growing
importance of strategic alliances by stating "M&A has long been considered one of the most important things a
CEO, and her/his company, will ever be involved in. But the pace and diversity of disruption is turning the spotlight
onto alliances as critical, strategic tools to address a wide range of competitive threats."2
The focus of this study is to examine the link between policy uncertainty, which is the
economic risk generated due to the uncertainty of government decisions, and strategic alliances. New
measures of policy uncertainty have generated a number of studies that examine the effect of policy
uncertainty on various corporate decisions relating to M&A (Nguyen and Phan 2017; Bonaime et al.
2018), capital investment (Gulen and Ion 2016), venture capital (Tian and Ye 2017), and initial public
offerings (IPOs) (Çolak et al. 2017). However, despite the economic importance of strategic alliances
as value-drivers for firms, the literature is silent on how policy uncertainty affects strategic alliance
deals between firms.

Strategic alliances are arrangements between two or more business entities to cooperate on products, technologies or
services (Gulati 1995). These vehicles are used to enter new markets (Robinson 2008), share mutually beneficial knowledge
(Gomes-Casseres et al. 2006), enhance their internal competencies (Lin and Darnall 2015), and pool financial resources
(Ozmel et al. 2013).
1

Strategic alliances: a real alternative to M&A? (KPMG, Jan 2018)
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ie/pdf/2018/01/ie-strategic-alliances-a-real-alternative-to-ma.pdf
Based on a survey of 1,300 CEOs, over 92 percent of the CEOs consider strategic alliances as "extremely important" or
"important" in their corporate strategy.
2
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Strategic alliances involve less investment, and rely heavily on co-operation from another party
providing a setting to investigate policy uncertainty’s possible effect on cooperation incentives. In this
study, we extend the analytical framework by contending that there is an alternative to the investment
irreversibility argument in the form of 'relational risk'– “the probability and consequences of not
having sufficient cooperation (Das and Teng 2001, 253),” which increases when policy is uncertain.
This view has been previously ignored in this literature. Put differently, this study allows us to consider
another significant factor at play, besides investment irreversibility, introducing tension in determining
the net effect on strategic alliances under policy uncertainty.
Research shows that unethical practices are more likely in an unstable environment (Xie et al.
2019). When one partner in an alliance fails or behaves unethically, the other partner gets adversely
affected (Boone and Ivanov 2012; Piercy and Lane 2007). To this end, the KPMG paper states that
“Even though strategic alliances offer many advantages, success can be difficult to achieve due to the
unique challenges this form of collaboration can present (KPMG 2018, 7).” Hence, strategic alliances
offer a unique setting to examine the extent to which relational risk, the intrinsic risk when firms are
in a transactional relationship with another firm(s), affects corporate capital investment activity.
In times of elevated policy uncertainty, strategic alliances are especially exposed to adverse
selection problems where the partner might want to enter the alliance to alleviate their own
(standalone) risk from policy uncertainty, which may lead to a lower chance of success for the alliance.
The risk might also come from an increased risk of failure to meet regulators’, suppliers’ or customers’
expectations. Relational risks increase during uncertain times, such as during periods of high policy
uncertainty (Krishnan et al. 2016; Podolny 1994; Williamson 1985), as anticipated benefits from
strategic alliances often fail to materialize (Gottschalg and Zollo 2007; Kale et al. 2002). During times
of elevated policy uncertainty, the anticipated benefits are even less likely to be achieved as the parties
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are more prone to act in their self-interest to navigate policy unpredictability rather than in the
common interest of all parties. Hence, the free-rider problem may exacerbate during periods of high
policy uncertainty. Further, increase in policy uncertainty is expected to result in higher contracting
costs due to the need for greater detail in the contracts (Battigalli and Maggi 2008) and higher
likelihood of testing the boundaries of incomplete contracts (Tirole 1999).
To study the association between policy uncertainty and strategic alliances, we collect data
from multiple sources. Our measure for policy uncertainty is an index developed by Baker et al. (2016).
This index uses three components: the number of times a term related to policy uncertainty appears
in a major newspaper, the uncertainty about the changes to the tax code, and the dispersion in forecasts
of the consumer price index and government spending. This measure is superior to the other measures
of policy uncertainty used in the past, such as stock return volatility, dispersion of analyst forecasts,
and uncertainties relating to social security, monetary and fiscal policies. These measures often focus
on a certain aspect of policy uncertainty, and fail to capture the overall policy uncertainty. The measure
developed by Baker et al. (2016) addresses these concerns. We collect data about how many strategic
alliances were undertaken by a firm in a particular year from the Securities Data Company (SDC)
platinum database. We obtain macro-economic controls from various other sources, such as consumer
surveys conducted by the University of Michigan and the Chicago Board Options Exchange.
The univariate and multivariate results both demonstrate that higher policy uncertainty is
associated with fewer strategic alliances. When we divide the sample into two groups based on the
highest and lowest tercile of the level of policy uncertainty, we find that when policy uncertainty is
low, 7.0 % of firms undertake alliances, but when it is high, only 3 % of firms undertake alliances. The
difference is highly significant. A multivariate framework, which controls for a wide variety of firmlevel and macro-economic controls, confirms that when policy uncertainty increases from 80 to 110,

4

by approximately one standard deviation, the probability of undertaking at least one alliance in a given
year drops from 5.74% to 4.26%. Considering that only 5.2% of firms undertake an alliance in a given
year, this drop is significant.
To verify that the association is not a simple correlation, but possibly causal, we conduct a
difference-in-differences analysis using gubernatorial election at the State-level similar to Çolak et al.
(2017). We conduct a state-year analysis where we use the gubernatorial election as a shock that creates
policy uncertainty. For every State-year with an election, we identify a bordering State-year without an
election and compare the change in the number of strategic alliances between the two groups. The
idea being that the unobserved shock is the same in both states, but the observed shock only occurs
in the state with an election. We find a significant drop in strategic alliances undertaken during times
of high policy uncertainty for firms in States that had an election. Further, this effect of policy
uncertainty is stronger when the election involves greater uncertainty such as a change in governor, or
winning by a small margin.
Overall, we document strong evidence that the number of new strategic alliances decreases
during times of high policy uncertainty, and that this association is not simply correlational. To
understand the mechanism by which policy uncertainty affects strategic alliances we investigate
further: First, we ask whether firms are particularly wary of undertaking alliances with multiple partners
during politically uncertain times. The greater the number of partners in an alliance, the greater the
likelihood that one of the partners will either behave opportunistically, or will end up unable to honor
their contractual undertakings, and hence jeopardize the alliance. If policy uncertainty increases the
partner-related risk, we expect fewer alliances with multiple partners. Our results support this idea.
Second, based on similar logic, we ask whether policy uncertainty has a stronger effect for firms that
have partners that can shirk relatively easily, for example, research-intensive firms or those belonging
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to service industries (Erramilli and Rao 1993; Krishnan et al. 2016; Ulset 1996). We find results
consistent with this notion. Third, we examine if policy uncertainty affects partnership in contract
intensive industries to a greater extent. The idea being that cost of enforcing an intense contract might
become higher as policy uncertainty increases. The results are consistent with the notion. The results
of these four tests suggest that the possibility of increased opportunistic (mis)behavior of a partner is
one of the key reasons firms are less likely to undertake an alliance during uncertain times.
It is also possible that although strategic alliances involve a smaller investment, there is still
exposure to investment irreversibility risk. While this may be a possibility, the additional tests we
conduct suggest that increased relational risk, rather than investment irreversibility might be the
primary reason why firms are reluctant to undertake new alliances during times of increased policy
uncertainty. To this end, we do not find that firms that involve greater investment and deeper
commitments such as manufacturing and supply alliances are particularly less likely during times of
policy uncertainty. We also do not find that policy uncertainty has a stronger effect on undertaking
alliances with partners that have less redeployable assets.
Our study raises two related questions. One, how does the effect of policy uncertainty on
undertaking strategic alliance compare with its effect on a firm’s decision to acquire a target? Two, is
the concern of investment’s irreversibility and relational risk different for acquisition, compared to
alliances? We find that the effect of policy uncertainty on undertaking a strategic alliance is slightly
stronger than its effect on acquisition. Our tests also show that policy uncertainty limits alliance
formation because of increases in relational risk, but limits acquisition because of irreversibility
concerns.

6

2. Related literature and hypotheses development
2.1.

Policy Uncertainty
Policy uncertainty is primarily rooted in politics. Increased political polarization can lead to

higher political uncertainty. Hence, policy uncertainty is man-made, primarily emanating from
anticipation of new government policies, or changes to existing policies that can potentially affect
corporate decision-making. Political uncertainty is not fully diversifiable, as such elevated political
uncertainty is accompanied by increases in risk premia and discount rates and thereby, adversely
affecting the net present value (NPV) of future projects (Pástor and Veronesi 2013).
2.2.

Strategic Alliances
We define a strategic alliance as an agreement between two or more firms to achieve a common

objective. Similarly, Yin and Shanley (2008) define strategic alliance as an “agreement between two or
more firms to jointly manage assets and achieve strategic objectives” (p. 473). A strategic alliance can
be either a joint venture or a contractual alliance. Appendix A presents an example of an alliance.
Because we want to understand the role of relational risk in curtailing investment, we focus
only on contractual strategic alliances and not joint-ventures. 3 In a contractual alliance (i.e., non-equity
alliance), firms craft a contract and pool resources to work together with a common objective. In a
joint venture, firms set up a new entity owned by the two firms or a larger number of parties. Examples
of contractual alliance include licensing, marketing, and R&D. Contractual alliances are significantly
more susceptible to relational risk than joint ventures. For example, Boone and Ivanov (2012) find
that the bankruptcy of a partner adversely affects another partner in a contractual alliance, but not in
joint ventures.

3

Including joint ventures does not change any of our conclusions. The results are similar.
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2.3.

Motivation for strategic alliances
The management literature examines factors that motivate firms to undertake strategic alliances

(e.g., Gulati 1999; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Lin and Darnall 2015). The transaction cost
view of strategic alliances suggests that firms try to minimize the cost of resources they need to meet
their strategic initiatives. There are various options open to firms to acquire specific resources, such
as developing the resources organically, acquiring the resources from another firm, or entering into a
strategic alliance with another firm. Strategic alliances represent a compromise between the first two
options.
The resource-based view (RBV) (e.g., Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986) offers an alternative view
on why firms seek to undertake alliances. It argues that a firm may not have adequate expertise to
produce what it needs in order to improve its competitive edge over its competitors. Strategic alliances
(along with acquisitions) are tools for the firm to obtain these valuable resources from outside.
Sometimes strategic alliances are viewed as substitutes for acquisitions. The RBV also indicates
when a strategic alliance might be more attractive than an acquisition. Acquisition can be costly and
not viable when the resource that a firm is interested in acquiring is difficult to extricate from the
remaining assets. Under such circumstances, a strategic alliance is a better option. The strategic alliance
is also a tool to retain valuable resources. Occasionally, firms may have excess resources that need to
be put to use, when a strategic alliance with another firm in need of these excess resources can be
valuable to both parties. Strategic alliances can also be motivated simply to prevent a firm's knowhow from decaying (Nelson and Winter 2009). Such a collaboration may be a cheaper option than
laying off researchers or selling off currently underutilized parts of the firm.
Yin and Shanley (2008) examine industry determinants of the choice between acquisition and
strategic alliance. They suggest that M&A will be more likely in physical-capital-intensive industries
and those with a high level of tacit knowledge. Firms in capital-intensive industries have higher fixed
8

costs and depend upon economies of scale and scope for success. In these industries, acquiring a new
firm can increase competitive advantage. A higher tacit knowledge means that most of the knowledge
cannot be transferred in an alliance, and the costs of contracting are higher. They argue that an alliance
will be more likely in industries characterized by a high level of specialized human assets. The reason
for this is that it is hard to prevent employees from leaving, and if a firm were to buy another firm
because of the employees, it is possible that the employees might leave the firm post-merger,
particularly since M&As tend to create cultural clashes.
2.4.

Does policy uncertainty affect the propensity to undertake strategic alliances?
The effect of policy uncertainty on a firm’s propensity to undertake strategic alliances is unclear.

Two opposing arguments can be made in this regard. Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) argue that
depending on the extent of strategic advantage an investment is likely to confer, it may be
advantageous to invest more during times of uncertainty. They propose the concept of growth option
rooted in the idea that uncertainty can provide an opportunity to indulge in risky activities, such as
attempts to build up new capabilities and gain the upper hand among one’s competitors because of
the first-mover advantage. They state, “[W]hen strategic investment has a significant preemptive
effect, it leads to higher market share, and thus a greater (relative) convexity of ex post profits relative
to the case of no investment. As a result, even though the value of not investing increases with rising
uncertainty, the value of the growth option increases even more” (p. 1022). Because strategic alliances
constitute a low-cost approach to building new capabilities, firms may want to undertake more
strategic alliances during times of high policy uncertainty.
Uncertainty also increases the risk for the firm (Pástor and Veronesi 2013), which prompts
the need to reduce such risk. Strategic alliances can be regarded as a relatively low-cost strategy to
hedge (Devlin and Bleackley 1988). A firm could undertake multiple alliances spanning different
9

geographic regions and industries, thereby reducing the turbulence created due to policy uncertainty.
Harrigan (1988) argues that expected market turbulence increases the co-operative behavior of firms.
Dickson and Weaver (1997) use survey data from 433 Norwegian firms to examine the effect of
perceived environmental uncertainty of different sorts of strategic alliance. They find that perception of
general uncertainty, volatility due to technology, and internationalization increased the propensity to
undertake an alliance. If policy uncertainty affects managers the same way as general uncertainty in
Dickson and Weaver (1997), we could expect it to encourage the number of strategic alliances.
Another reason strategic alliances could increase when policy uncertainty is high is that,
compared to an acquisition, it is a low-cost way to acquire new skills and penetrate new markets.
Unlike acquisition, which is a large irreversible investment and one that managers tend to avoid when
policy uncertainty is high (Nguyen and Phan 2017), alliances are low-cost investments and not as costly
to reverse as they are staggered, and managers have an option to abandon if they are not successful
(McGrath et al. 2004; Smit and Trigeorgis 2012; Merton 1998). Insofar as managers view strategic
alliances as a substitute for mergers, and consider it as a low cost investment, they might undertake
more strategic alliances when policy uncertainty is high. Based on this line of reasoning, we propose
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1a: Policy uncertainty is associated with more strategic alliances.
Policy uncertainty can also reduce the likelihood of an alliance as the relational (counterparty)
risk increases during such times. Strategic alliances, by design, are inherently exposed to the risk that
a partner in the alliance might act opportunistically. High policy uncertainty will lead to high
environmental uncertainty that “results from changes in the environment that are difficult to predict,
such as volatility in the product market as well as regulatory changes” (Krishnan et al. 2016, 2523),
which in turn reduces transparency and increases the benefits of opportunistic behavior (Krishnan et
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al. 2016; Williamson 1985). For example, Stein and Wang (2016) find that during periods of
uncertainty, managers manipulate earnings to a greater extent.
Further, in times of high policy uncertainty, strategic alliances can be even more exposed to
adverse selection problems where one party enters the alliance to alleviate their own (standalone) risk
from policy uncertainty leading to a lower chance of success for the alliance. Podolny (1994) argues
that during periods of environmental uncertainty, consumer demand, input costs, and the competitive
climate are difficult to assess, thereby making it hard to decipher the quality of the partner. Firms bear
the negative spillover when their partners fail to meet regulators’, suppliers’ or customers’ expectations
(Boone and Ivanov 2012). These risks increase during uncertain times, such as during periods of high
policy uncertainty (Krishnan et al. 2016; Podolny 1994; Williamson 1985).
The free-rider problem is another aspect of relational risk that is likely to exacerbate during
periods of high policy uncertainty. Anticipated benefits from strategic alliances often fail to materialize
(Gottschalg and Zollo 2007; Kale et al. 2002). During times of elevated policy uncertainty, the
anticipated benefits are even less likely to be achieved as the parties are more likely to act in their selfinterest to navigate policy unpredictability rather than in the common interest of all parties associated
with the strategic alliance.
Besides relational risk, arguably, the irreversibility of investment could also adversely affect the
incentive to undertake an alliance. We argue earlier that because strategic alliances are substitutes for
M&A and require less investment, it could increase when policy uncertainty increases because
managers may choose a substitute where the investment irreversibility is less severe. However, it can
also be argued that although the investments involved in alliances are less compared to acquisitions,
it still involves committing resources. Hence, managers may want to wait until policy uncertainty is
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resolved before they undertake a strategic alliance. Based on the above discussion, we propose the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1b: Policy uncertainty is associated with fewer strategic alliances.
2.5.
Why might policy uncertainty be associated with fewer strategic alliances?
2.5.1. The role of relational risk
In the preceding discussion, we hypothesized that firms would shy away from undertaking
alliances during times when policy uncertainty is high because they fear greater relational risk such as
an increased likelihood of counterparty risk, and greater incentives for the partners to misbehave
during such times. If the probability of a partner misbehaving indeed goes up during times of policy
uncertainty, then we should observe that strategic alliances where the risk of a partner misbehaving is
higher are particularly sensitive to political uncertainty. For example, we should find that alliances that
involve multiple partners are particularly unlikely during such times. The idea is that the greater the
number of partners involved in an alliance, the greater the probability that one of the partners will
behave opportunistically. Therefore, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 2a: When policy uncertainty is high, there will be fewer alliances with multiple partners.
Counterparty (or relational) risk is also higher when the partner belongs to R&D-intensive
industries or the service industry. Krishnan et al. (2016) note the following:
….the potential for opportunistic gains in the presence of behavioral uncertainty is higher in
alliances belonging to R&D-intensive industries, where monitoring and evaluating intellectual
activity is difficult (Ulset, 1996), and in alliances belonging to service industries, where
monitoring performance is hard, owing to inseparability of production and consumption
(Erramilli and Rao, 1993)…( p. 2523)
If our line of logic that increased relational risk is the reason firms shy away from undertaking new
alliances is correct, then we should expect a negative association between policy uncertainty and the
volume of strategic alliances undertaken to be stronger in industries where the probability of relational
risk is higher. This leads us to the following hypothesis.
12

Hypothesis 2b: The effect of policy uncertainty on the undertaking of strategic alliances is stronger when
the partner in the alliance is R&D-intensive or belongs to the service industries.
Relational risk is also likely to be higher in alliances with partners in contract intensive industries
such as automobiles, aircraft, computer and electronic equipment. In these industries, inputs are
customized and are not sold in thick markets. The relational risk will be less in industries that are less
contract-intensive such as poultry processing, flour milling, petroleum refiners where inputs are not
customized and they are sold in thick markets. Nunn (2007) finds that countries with low-quality law
enforcement specialize in producing goods that require less intensive contracts, as they have cost
disadvantage in producing goods that require a more intense contract. This line of thought can be
extended to the way policy uncertainty affects alliance formation. When the expectation that a partner
may not be able to fulfill their contract in the future increases, firms will shy away from forming
alliances that involve more intense contracts. Therefore, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 2c: The effect of policy uncertainty on the undertaking of strategic alliances is stronger when the
partner belongs to an industry involving high contract-intensity.
2.5.2. The role of investment’s irreversibility
A significant body of theoretical and empirical literature supports the view that firms delay
investments during periods of increased policy uncertainty. Indeed, research that examines the effect
of policy uncertainty on investments shows that the effect of policy uncertainty is stronger for
investments with greater degree of irreversibility. For example, Bonaime et al. (2018) find that the
adverse effect of policy uncertainty on the acquisition of a target is much stronger if the target belongs
to an industry with higher PPE-to-assets ratio, which is a proxy for the degree of irreversibility of the
acquisition, or to an industry with lower asset redeployability. A similar line of argument would suggest
that, although the amount of investments in strategic alliances is considerably less than that in an
acquisition, firms would prefer to delay strategic alliances with greater irreversible investment.
13

Compared to licensing and marketing alliances, alliances involved in manufacturing, and supply
are likely to involve deeper commitments and more irreversible investments. Hence, we expect policy
uncertainty to have a stronger effect on manufacturing and supply alliances, compared to licensing
and marketing alliances4. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3a: The adverse effect of policy uncertainty on alliances associated with a greater degree of
irreversibility (e.g., manufacturing) is stronger compared to that for alliances associated with more reversible
investments (e.g., licensing and marketing).
Bonaime et al. (2018) find that firms are even less likely to acquire a target in industries that have
less redeployable assets as they are less reversible. If irreversibility is a concern in the formation of
alliances, it is possible that managers may shy away from forming alliances with partners in industries
with a lower level of asset redeployability as those alliances may be less reversible. Hence, we make
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3b: The negative effect of enhanced policy uncertainty on strategic alliance creations is stronger
when the prospective partner belongs to an industry that has assets with lower redeployability.
2.6. The effect of policy uncertainty on strategic alliance formations vis-a-vis acquisitions
As discussed earlier, investment irreversibility, as a determining factor, is more important for
mergers and acquisitions, while relational risk is of greater prominence for strategic alliance formations
because they necessitate continued cooperation of the partners involved throughout the alliance
period. Hence we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 4: Increase in policy uncertainty adversely affects strategic alliance formations to a greater extent
when they are associated with greater relational risk (e.g., greater contracting intensity), but not when they are
less reversible (e.g., lower asset redeployability), while the adverse effect of enhanced policy uncertainty on
acquisitions is expected to be greater with increased asset irreversibility, but not with increased relational risk.

R&D alliances are also relatively irreversible, but we do not include them as these alliances also have higher growth
options and many are attractive during policy uncertainty. Hence, the inclusion of these alliances would mask the effect
of irreversibility and make it difficult to interpret the result.
4
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3. Data, variables, and sample formation process
3.1.

Measuring policy uncertainty
We use the policy uncertainty index developed by Baker et al. (2016). These data are constructed

monthly and is publically available. 5 They develop an index for economic uncertainty by constructing
a weighted average of (i) the frequency of keywords such as “economy”, “uncertain”, “deficit”,
“regulation” etc. in 10 leading newspapers in the U.S 6., (ii) the uncertainty associated with changes in
tax code, which is the dollar-weighted federal tax code provision, set to expire in 10 years, reported
by the Congressional Budget Office, and (iii) disagreement in forecasting monetary policy and fiscal
policy constructed using the government spending uncertainty index, and the inflation uncertainty
index. The overall index is constructed by weighting these indexes, 1/2, 1/6, and 1/3 respectively.
Their measure peaks near tight presidential elections, wars, terror attacks such as 9/11, and during
battles over fiscal policy and the debt-ceiling.
Because our analysis is at the firm-year level, we construct a yearly index using the monthly
data. The measure of policy uncertainty is the weighted average policy uncertainty in the past 12
months. Policy uncertainty in the immediate past is going to affect the undertaken of strategic alliances.
In other words, compared to uncertainty in January 2010, the uncertainty in December 2010 is going
to have a greater impact on strategic alliances undertaken in 2011. Thus, we attach much more weight
to the policy uncertainty in December 2010. We construct the yearly policy uncertainty index as
follows.

http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_monthly.html
These newspapers include The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, USA Today, The Boston Globe,
The Dallas Morning News, the Los Angeles Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Chicago Tribune, and the Miami Herald.
5
6
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Policy Uncertainty t = ((Policy Uncertainty) (y-12)*12 + Policy Uncertainty (y-11)*11 + Policy Uncertainty (y-10)*10 +
Policy Uncertainty (y-9)*9 + Policy Uncertainty (y-8)*8 + Policy Uncertainty (y-7)*7 + Policy Uncertainty (y-6)*6 + Policy
Uncertainty

(y-5)

*5 + Policy Uncertainty

(y-4)

*4 + Policy Uncertainty

(y-3)

*3 + Policy Uncertainty

(y-2)

*2 + Policy

Uncertainty (y-1))/ 78

where, Policy Uncertainty (y-12), refers to the policy uncertainty in December, Policy Uncertainty (y-11) refers to
the policy uncertainty in November and so on. Our approach is similar to Nguyen and Phan (2017).
The only difference between our approach and theirs is that instead of taking the weighted average of
the last three months, we take the weighted average of the last 12 months. 7
3.2.

Measuring the number of strategic alliances
We retrieve the alliance data over the twenty-nine years between 1990 and 2019 from the SDC

Platinum database. This database is regarded as one of the most comprehensive databases for strategic
alliances (Anand and Khanna 2000). The SDC obtains alliances from newspapers and corporate press
releases. We count the number of strategic alliances a firm undertakes each year. From this dataset,
we obtain the six-digit CUSIP of the firm, the year of the alliance, and the total number of alliances
that the firm initiated that year. We include all types of contractual alliances, including licensing
agreements, marketing or distribution agreements, research and development agreements, technology
transfer agreements, and others.
3.3.

Control variables
The literature on strategic alliances and policy uncertainty motivates our choice of control

variables. Because our goal is to examine how policy uncertainty affects the propensity to undertake a
Our results are similar if we follow the procedure as in Nguyen and Phan (2017). They calculate policy uncertainty as
follows: Policy Uncertainty t = (Policy Uncertainty (t-1)*3+ Policy Uncertainty (t-2)*2 + (Policy Uncertainty) (t-3))/6. Our results are also
qualitatively similar if we use the arithmetic mean rather than the weighted average.
7
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strategic alliance, the dependent variable is whether the firm engaged in a strategic alliance in a given
year, and the key independent variable is the measure for policy uncertainty in the preceding year. The
control variables we use are largely based on prior studies that examine either the propensity to
undertake a strategic alliance (Gulati 1995; Kim and Higgins 2007) or the effect of policy uncertainty
on investment decisions (Bonaime et al. 2018; Gulen and Ion 2016; Nguyen and Phan 2017).
At the firm level we control for the size of total assets, the age of the firm, the market-to-book
ratio, the cash-to-assets ratio, and the ratio of R&D expense to total assets. We also use an indicator
variable that measures whether the firm has any R&D expenses, income, gross profit margin, the ratio
of debt to assets, the ratio of PPE to assets, and sales growth. A large firm with high R&D expenditures
and more cash is likely to be more aggressive at entering into strategic alliances.
At the macroeconomic level, we control for the dispersion in sales growth, volatility of real
earnings, an index that measures future economic activity, a measure that captures consumer
expectations, an index that captures the real earnings of firms in the U.S., the current economic
conditions, consumer sentiment, an index that measures consumer sentiments using surveys, the
cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings index, and a measure of liquidity in the economy. These controls
are used because they capture the current economic condition and provide a view of future economic
conditions. These measures can affect the policies that politicians put forward, and they can also affect
a firm’s incentive to undertake an alliance. For example, during a downturn, politicians debate
economic policies more frequently and therefore increase policy uncertainty, and firms are more
cautious about their investment decisions such as forming an alliance. We also control for the time
trend because research indicates that CEOs are increasingly leaning toward undertaking strategic
alliances. In Appendix B we summarize all the variables we use in the study.
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3.4.

Sample formation process
The sample covers 170,117 firm-years, 17,567 firms, and 43 different industries based on Fama-

French’s 48 industry classification spanning the period 1990 to 2019. Panel A of Appendix C
summarizes the sample selection process. The sample selection is as follows: We start with the entire
Compustat dataset that covers the period from 1990 to 2019 and consists of 336,243 firm-years. We
remove firms that are not headquartered in the U.S. (42,317), and firms with missing data on total
assets or total sales (46,385). Next, using the SDC Platinum Database we obtain the number of
alliances in a firm-year. When there is no mention of the firm undertaking any alliance in a year, we
consider the firm to have formed zero alliances that year. Next, sequentially, we remove firm-years
that belong to the finance or utility industry (56,303); and that have missing values for Market-to-Book
(9,490), Sales growth (8,417), PPE (2,625), and other controls (589).
Panel B of Appendix C tabulates the number of observations by industry. Most observations
in our sample are from business services, electronic equipment, pharmaceutical products, and retail
industries. Together, these industries account for approximately one-third of the sample. Panel C
tabulates the number of observations, the number of alliances, and the number of firms that undertake
alliances by year. This panel shows that the 1990s witnessed more strategic alliances than the 2000s.
Panel D indicates frequency of the number of alliances a firm undertook in a year, if they did form at
least one alliance, 74% of firms undertook only one alliance, approximately 16% undertook two
alliances, and the rest undertook three or more alliances. Panel E indicates that about 93% of the
alliances had only one partner, while about 5% had two additional partners. Only approximately 0.42%
of the firms undertook an alliance that involved six other partners. Panel F tabulates the number of
the alliances by their types. The most common type of strategic alliance is a marketing alliance, and
the least common is a funding alliance.
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3.5.

Summary statistics and correlations
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data used in our baseline regression. The mean

of Alliance Dummy is 0.052. This number means that every year, on average, 5.2% of firms in our
sample undertook at least one new alliance. The mean of Policy Uncertainty is about 103, and the
standard deviation is approximately 25.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. The correlation between Alliance Dummy and Policy
Uncertainty is -0.07 and significant at 0.1% (p-value < 0.001). Policy Uncertainty is also negatively and
significantly correlated with macroeconomic factors such as the current economic conditions and
leading business cycle indicators.
<Insert Table 1>
<Insert Table 2>
4. Results
The results are organized as follows: First, we test Hypotheses 1a and 1b under univariate and
multivariate settings. We also use a difference-in-differences analysis. In all of these tests, we do not
find support for Hypothesis 1a. We find support for Hypothesis 1b, namely, the greater the policy
uncertainty, the lower the likelihood that the firm undertakes a strategic alliance.
Next, we focus on Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, and 3b to understand better why we find a
negative association between policy uncertainty and strategic alliances: Does the number of strategic
alliances decline due to an increase in relational (counterparty) risk (Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c)? Or,
because of investment irreversibility (Hypotheses 3a and 3b)? We find support for Hypotheses 2a, 2b,
and 2c consistent with the idea that the effect of policy uncertainty is stronger for alliances where
relational risk matters more. We do not find support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. In other words, in
contrast to the reason documented in previous studies related to mergers and acquisitions, it does not
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appear that investment irreversibility is a primary driver of why firms undertake fewer strategic
alliances when policy uncertainty increases.
In Hypothesis 4, we find further evidence that policy uncertainty affects corporate alliance
formations via the relational (or counterparty) risk channel, while acquisitions are affected due to
investment irreversibility.
4.1.

Policy uncertainty and strategic alliances

4.1.1. Univariate tests
In Figure 1 we plot a graph of No. of Alliances and Policy Uncertainty over the sample period. The
X-axis depicts the month and year, and the Y-axis (left) has the rolling sum of the number of alliances
in the preceding 12 months, with policy uncertainty shown on the right axis. This figure indicates that
fewer strategic alliances are undertaken during periods of high policy uncertainty.
<Insert Figure 1>
To conduct a formal test, we divide the sample into three groups based on the level of Policy
Uncertainty and calculate the mean of Alliance Dummy. The results, presented graphically in Figure 2,
demonstrate that when policy uncertainty is in the lowest tercile 7% of firms undertake an alliance,
and when it is in the highest tercile, only 3% of the firms undertake at least one alliance. A two-tailed
t-test shows that the difference is statistically significant due to a p-value of less than 0.001%.
<Insert Figure 2>
4.1.2. Multivariate test
To estimate the effect of policy uncertainty on the undertaking of strategic alliances in a
multivariate setting, we use the following logit model:
Alliances Dummy it = α + β× Policy Uncertainty t-1 + δ× X it+ λ × M t+ Time trend t
+ Industry Indicators i + ε it

(1)
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where i refers to the firm and t is the year. Alliances Dummy it is an indicator variable that is equal
to one if a firm undertakes a strategic alliance that year. Policy Uncertainty t-1 is the policy uncertainty in
the preceding year. X

it

is a set of firm-level control variables as follows: Ln(assets) is the natural

logarithm of the total assets; Age is the age of the firm; Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value
to the book value; Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents of the firms to the total assets; R&D
is the ratio of R&D expenditure to the total assets of the firm; R&D dummy is a dummy variable that
indicates whether the firm’s R&D expenditure in that year is missing; EBIT is the ratio of earnings
before income and taxes (EBIT) to total assets; Gross margin is the sales revenue minus its cost of
goods sold (COGS) that is divided by total sales revenue; Debt is the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets; PPE is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets; and M t is a set of yearlevel control variables.
The year-level controls are as follows: Sales growth is the log of sales divided by previous year's
sales; Sales growth dispersion is the cross-sectional standard deviation in the sales growth of all firms for
that year; Real earnings volatility is the 12-month rolling standard deviation in real earnings; business cycle
indicator is an index that measures the future economic activity that is based on 11 leading economic
indicators that appear to have significant predictive power over future GDP growth; Real earnings index
is an index of the real earnings of publicly traded firms in the US; Current economic conditions is an index
that measures the current economic condition through surveys; CAPE Shiller index is Shiller's cyclically
adjusted price-to-earnings index; BAA-Fed fund rate is the difference in the yields of the Moody's
seasoned corporate Baa-rated bonds and the Fed’s fund rate; and Time trend is the numerical value of
the year. To account for the possibility that errors might be correlated by firm and year, we cluster the
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standard errors by firm and year8. We provide the details of the variables and their sources in Appendix
B.
The results of the logit model are consistent with Hypothesis 1b, that is, when policy
uncertainty is high, a firm has a lower probability of undertaking a strategic alliance. The results are
reported in Table 3. The table shows the coefficients from the logit model. The coefficient for Policy
Uncertainty is negative and significant at a p-value < 0.001 regardless of whether we use a full set of
controls that include the firm level, year level, and the time trend (column 1), only the firm level
(column 2), or no controls (column 3). Moreover, the coefficient for Policy Uncertainty continues to be
significant at a p-value < 0.001 even when we use a firm fixed effect (column 4). A firm fixed effect
controls for all time-invariant firm characteristics. A fixed-effect test, by construction, does not use
firms that did not undertake any strategic alliance during the sample period; hence the sample reduces
by approximately 65%, from 170,117 to 59,617.
The economic significance of the coefficient is quite large based on column 1 of Table 3. For
example, holding the other variables constant at their mean, an increase in Policy Uncertainty of 30 points
(from 80 to 110) reduces the probability of undertaking a strategic alliance from 0.0522 to 0.0392 (see
Figure 3)9— a drop of approximately 25%. A 30-point increase in policy uncertainty is only slightly
above an increase of one standard deviation. The standard deviation in Policy Uncertainty is 25.257.
<Insert Table 3>
<Insert Figure 3>

The coefficient of Policy Uncertainty continues to be highly significant (p-values< 0.001) when we use alternative
clustering (by firm, year, industry, or industry and year).
9 We use the command “margins” in STATA to obtain the marginal probability of forming an alliance when other
variables are held at the mean and “marginsplot” to plot a graph.
8
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4.1.3. Robustness checks
Table 4 reports the results of robustness tests. Rather than use a logit model, we use a linear
probability model (i.e., OLS) and confirm that the association between Policy Uncertainty and the Alliance
Dummy remains significant. These results are reported in column 1 of Panel A of Table 4. The results
reported in column 2 show that the results are also robust when we use No. of Alliances as the dependent
variable, replacing Alliance Dummy. The advantage of using No. of Alliances is that it accounts for the
firms that reduced their number of strategic alliances but did not reduce them to zero. This contrasts
with the use of Alliance Dummy, which does not consider the firm that reduces its number of alliances
from, for example, two to one. The results reported in column 3 indicate that this association is also
robust when we use a negative binomial regression.
The results reported in Panel B indicate that the Hypothesis 1b holds for different types of
alliances. The results reported in Panel C indicate that this hypothesis also holds for each individual
component of the policy uncertainty measure (i.e. News component, Government Spend component, CPI
component, and Tax component).10
<Insert Table 4>
4.1.4. Difference-in-differences analysis
To address the issue of causality, we follow Çolak et al. (2017) and use neighboring-states,
difference-in-differences method.11 As in their study we use an election in the state as a measure of
policy uncertainty. For every state-year, we identify the states that did not have an election but that
shared a border with the state that had an election. Next, we compare the number of strategic

In unreported tests, we also verify that the results hold when we remove observations from 2008, 2008 and 2009,
2007-2009, or 2007-2010.
10

11

Çolak et al. (2017) use this method to examine the effect of political uncertainty on an IPO offering.
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alliances. Because the neighboring states face the same unobserved shocks, when we take the
difference in the dependent variable, the effect of the unobserved shocks cancels out, and the
difference therefore, in the number of strategic alliances, can be attributed to the uncertainty due to
the election.
The model we use can be summarized in the following equation:

Д No. of Alliances i, j, t = β× Election Year i, t + δ× Д X i, j, t+ ε it (2)
where Д No. of Alliances i, j, t is the total number of strategic alliances that occurred in a state with an
election (i) minus the total number of alliances that occurred in a neighboring state without an election
(j) in year t. Election Year is a dummy variable that is equal to one if year t is an election year in the
state the firm is headquartered as in Çolak et al. (2017). By design, our dependent variable can only be
constructed if State i has an election. Therefore, the Election Year variable will always be one. That is,
it is a constant. X

i, j, t

is the difference in the observable state characteristics. We use the following

measures: the lagged value of the average number of firms in the two states (based on COMPUSTAT),
the lagged value of the number of strategic alliances in the state, the lagged value of growth in state
GDP per capita, the lagged value of the unemployment rate, and year dummies to control for timeinvariant macroeconomic factors that might affect the strategic alliance in a given year.
States without neighboring states (Alaska and Hawaii) are automatically dropped from this
sample. In our sample, on average there are three neighboring states. Thirty-six of the states with
elections share a border with at least one state without an election. Tennessee and Missouri have eight
neighboring states.
If the coefficient for Election Year is negative, it indicates that during an election year, the
number of new strategic alliances decreases. Put differently, policy uncertainty reduces the likelihood
of a strategic alliance. We can also easily interpret the economic significance. The magnitude of this
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coefficient indicates how many fewer alliances were undertaken in a state with an election, compared
to a neighboring state where there was no election.
The results of this difference-in-differences analysis are reported in Panel A of Table 5. The
dependent variable in this regression is the difference in the number of alliances in a state with an
election minus the number of strategic alliances in a neighboring state without an election. The results
reported in column 2 show that the coefficient for Election Year is -0.0558 and significant at 1%. That
is, during an election year there are 0.0558 fewer alliances undertaken. This number is significant,
because the average of the difference in the number of alliances between the two states is -2.045, and
therefore a reduction is equivalent to a drop of 2.72%.
In Panel B, we report the results of tests that ask if the difference-in-differences results are
stronger for elections when policy uncertainty is higher. Following Çolak et al. (2017) we consider an
election to be more uncertain when (i) the election leads to a change in the governor and if she wins
by less than 5% margin, or (ii) the incumbent is not a candidate for governor on the election for
reasons other than expiration of term limit, (iii) the difference in the percentage of winning margin is
less than the median. In each of these instances, we find that the results are stronger when elections
are uncertain.
In Panel C, we report the results of the dynamic difference-in-differences analysis. In this
panel, the dependent variable is # of Alliances in a state with election. The results show that pre-election
years are not associated with an increase or decrease in alliances, but after the election is over there is
a jump in the number of strategic alliances formed. This suggests that some managers would rather
wait for the election to be over to get into an alliance.
<Insert Table 5>
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4.2. The role of relational (or counterparty) risk in strategic alliance formations
4.2.1. Strategic alliances with multiple partners
We find results consistent with Hypothesis 2a indicating that firms are less likely to undertake
alliances that have more than two partners during times of increased policy uncertainty. This finding
means that increased relational risk may be a reason why firms prefer to not undertake strategic
alliances during times of enhanced policy uncertainty. The results are based on a subsample of firms
that undertake at least one alliance during our sample period. Using this subsample, we examine
whether firms are less likely to undertake alliances that have more than two partners. The results are
reported in Panel A of Table 6.
The dependent variable in these tests is More than two partners in alliance, an indicator variable
that equals one if the number of partners in the alliance is more than two. 12 Regardless of whether we
use an extensive set of controls (column 1), control only for firm characteristics (column 2), or no
controls (column 3), the coefficient for Policy Uncertainty continues to be negative and statistically
significant. When Policy Uncertainty increases from 80 to 110, a change of approximately one standard
deviation, the probability of having multiple partners drops from 10.39% to 8.48%, holding all other
variables at the mean.
<Insert Table 6>
4.2.2.

The effect of policy uncertainty when partners are in R&D-intensive or in service
industries
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, we find that the adverse effect of policy uncertainty on alliance

formation is much stronger when the partner is R&D intensive or when it belongs to a service
industry. We examine two subsamples of firms in: (a) R&D intensive, and (b) service industries.

Rarely does a firm undertake two or more alliances. In such cases, if any one of the alliances has multiple partners, we
consider the indicator variable to be one.
12
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In Table 6 (Panel B) column 1, we examine cases where the firm allied with prospective
partners that reported some R&D expenditures and where the firm did not form any alliance. In
column 2, the sample consists of instances where the firm allied with partners that did not report any
R&D expenditure, or where the firm did not form any alliance. We find that the coefficient of Policy
Uncertainty is negative in both columns, but significantly larger in magnitude in column 1 indicating
that Policy Uncertainty has a greater adverse effect on forming alliances with a research-intensive firm.
The results of the pooled analysis in column 3 also echo the same findings.
Panel C’s column 1 reports results for strategic alliances formed with partners in the service
industry13 or that did not form any alliance. Column 2 reports the results of the subsample that consists
of alliances formed when the alliances involve all industries except services and instances where the
firm did not form any alliance. The results show that the coefficient of Policy Uncertainty is significantly
larger when alliances are with partners in the service industry indicating that policy uncertainty reduces
the likelihood of alliance formation with partners in the service industry to a greater extent. Column
3, which reports the pooled analysis, also demonstrates that alliance formation decreases to a greater
extent when the partner is from a service industry. Overall, the findings in this section support the
notion that strategic alliances that are exposed to a greater degree of relation risk are affected more
adversely from increased policy uncertainty.
4.2.3. Strategic alliance and contract intensity
Panel D of Table 6 reports the results consistent with Hypothesis 2c. Policy uncertainty affects
the likelihood of alliance formation to a greater extent when the partner is from a contract- intensive
industry. Nunn (2007) provides a list of the twenty most and least contract intensive industries. We

We consider the partner as belonging to the service industry if based on Fama-French industry classifications, it is
classified as household services (33), or business service (34).
13
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use this data to classify the partners.14 We find that in a subsample of firm-years where a partner
belongs to a most contract-intensive industry, the effect is much stronger (column 1), compared to
the subsample of where the partner belongs to an industry with lower contract intensity (column 2).
A pooled analysis reported in column 3 also reports the same finding. The coefficient of Policy
Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry is negative and highly significant. Contract Intensive Industry is one
when the partner belongs to an industry that is ranked among the top twenty industries requiring the
most intense contracts. Similar to the findings in the preceding section, these results reinforce the
notion that relation risk plays a significant role in determining the effect of increased policy uncertainty
on strategic alliances.
4.3.

The role of investment irreversibility on strategic alliances

4.3.1. Alliances that involve deeper commitments
To examine to what extent investment irreversibility plays a role in affecting strategic alliances
under enhanced policy uncertainty regimes we create two subsamples. The two groups are created
based on the type of alliance. In one group, we consider manufacturing, supply alliances, and funding
alliances. These are the types that are much more costly to reverse. In another group, we consider
licensing and marketing alliances, ones where the cost of reversing is lower. The results reported in
Panel A of Table 7 show that the coefficient of Policy Uncertainty is not significantly different between
the two groups. The p-value for the test that they are equal is 0.7106. A pooled test that uses both the
subsample and an interaction term also shows that the effect of policy uncertainty is not significantly
different between the two groups. Hence, the results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 3a. In other

Nunn (2007)’s Table II lists the 20 least and most contract intensive industries. We take this list and code these same
industries to be the least and most contract intensive industries for all the years in our sample. The least contract intensive
industries have a median value of 0.132, while most contract intensive industries have a median value of 0.872. The least
contract intensive industry is poultry processing with an intensity score of 0.024, and the most contract- intensive is the
automobile and light truck manufacturing industry with an intensity score of 0.98.
14
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words, we do not find that the effect of policy uncertainty on undertaking strategic alliances is stronger
for those alliances that involve deeper commitments and are difficult to reverse.
<Insert Table 7>
4.3.2. Alliances with partners in irreversible industries
We do not find that partnering with firms that belong to industries that have lower asset
redeployability is less likely. Panel B of Table 7 reports the results. We use the measure of asset
redeployability as in Kim and Kung (2016) and divide the sample into two groups based on whether
the partners belong to industries with high or low asset redeployability. The coefficient of Policy
Uncertainty is not significantly different between the two groups. The p-value for the test that the
coefficients are equal is 0.3573. We also construct an indicator variable Asset Redeployable that is one if
the asset redeployability of the partner is above the median and zero otherwise, and interact it with
Policy Uncertainty and conduct a pooled analysis (column 3). Hence, these results are also inconsistent
with Hypothesis 3b.
4.4

Policy uncertainty’s effect on undertaking strategic alliances vis-a-vis acquisitions
Relational risk does not appear to be the channel by which policy uncertainty affects the

decision to acquire a target. In results reported in Panel A of Table 8, where the dependent variable is
the Acquisition Dummy, we do not find that policy uncertainty affects the likelihood of an acquisition
to a greater extent when the target belongs to contract-intensive industries, which is a proxy for
instance when relational risk might matter more. However, consistent with prior literature, investment
irreversibility appears to be a reason why firms avoid acquisitions when policy uncertainty increases.
The results we report in Panel B show that Policy Uncertainty affects the likelihood of mergers much
more strongly when the target’s assets are less redeployable, consistent with Bonaime et al. (2018).
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We reach the same conclusion when we introduce Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry
and Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable in the same regression with Acquisition Dummy as the dependent
variable. The coefficient of Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry is insignificant. In contrast, the
coefficient of Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable is positive and significant (Panel C column 1),
suggesting that the decision to acquire may not be affected by relational risk, but is affected by the
cost of irreversibility of investment. In contrast, when Alliance Dummy is the dependent variable, the
coefficient of Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry, is negative and significant, while the coefficient
of Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable is insignificant (column 2) suggesting that relational risk matters
for strategic alliances, whereas investment irreversibility is not a significant factor driving strategic
alliances. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 4. These findings reveal that, under enhanced
policy uncertainty, the primary channel affecting strategic alliance formations is quite different from
that influencing corporate acquisitions.
<Insert Table 8>
4.5. Additional analysis
We examine if the probability of abandoning a strategic alliance increases under enhanced
policy uncertainty. Additionally, we examine the stock market reaction to strategic alliance
announcements during enhanced policy uncertainty, and compare the relative effect of policy
uncertainty on alliances vis-à-vis acquisitions
4.5.1. Are firms more likely to abandon corporate alliances during increased policy uncertainty
regimes?
A key argument in our study is that forming an alliance becomes less attractive during times of
increased policy uncertainty because of the increased likelihood of counterparty misbehavior. If that
is indeed the case, a firm should be more likely to withdraw from an alliance already in place during
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such times because as the uncertainty increases the expected net present value to continue with the
alliance falls and, in some instances, may even become negative.
Our data allow us to examine these questions. Some of the alliances that are announced are
broken off even before they start. The dates when these alliances were broken off are retrieved from
the SDC Platinum Database. To examine whether firms are more likely to withdraw from an alliance
during times of uncertainty, we construct the variable Withdrawn. For each firm-year, this variable
equals one when there is a strategic alliance abandonment announcement, and zero otherwise.
When we divide the sample into two groups based on whether the period involves high or low
policy uncertainty, we find that the mean of the variable Withdrawn is 0.027 when policy uncertainty is
low, and 0.032 when it is high. This is a 18% increase. The multivariate results reported in Table 9
are largely consistent with our prediction in columns 2 and 3, where we do not control for macroeconomic variables. However, when we control for macroeconomic factors, we find that the Policy
Uncertainty is not significant.
In unreported tests, we investigate if Policy Uncertainty is associated with a higher likelihood of
withdrawals in subsamples where relational risks are high (e.g., the partner is R&D intensive, or from
the service industry, or belongs to a contract-intensive sector). We find that the coefficient is positive,
and t-statistics are higher, but the coefficients are still not statistically significant. From these tests, we
conclude that there isn’t convincing evidence that firms are likely to abandon already formed strategic
alliances when policy uncertainty increases.
<Insert Table 9>
4.5.2. Policy uncertainty and market response to strategic alliance announcements
We contend that strategic alliances undertaken during high policy uncertainty regimes pass a
higher bar and investors recognize them as higher quality ventures. A similar argument is made in
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two studies that find that firms are less likely to acquire another firm during times of high policy
uncertainty (Bonaime et al. 2018; Nguyen and Phan 2017). Both these studies report more positive
investor reaction to acquisitions undertaken during times of high policy uncertainty. In this vein, we
expect the CAR for alliances undertaken during times of uncertainty also to be higher.
Our empirical evidence supports this notion. We divide the sample into two groups based on
whether the alliance was undertaken in the years with high policy uncertainty separated by the median
Policy Uncertainty. Next, we test whether the CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (-2, +2)15 are greater for alliances
undertaken during periods of high policy uncertainty vis-à-vis those announced at other times. The
results indicate that CAR (-1, +1) is approximately 38% greater (0.0113/0.0082), and CAR (-2, +2) is
33 % (0.0118/0.0089) greater for high policy uncertainty periods. These differences in the CARs are
statistically significant due to a two-tailed t-test with a p-value <0.005. These univariate results also
hold in a multivariate framework. We continue to find that Policy Uncertainty is positively associated
with CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (-2, +2), after controlling for firm-level characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. Panels A and B of Table 10 present the univariate and multivariate results,
respectively.
<Insert Table 10>
4.5.3. The relative economic effect of policy uncertainty on alliance formations compared to
acquisitions
Our final analysis compares the economic impact of policy uncertainty on the likelihood of
alliance formation with the impact on the likelihood of acquisitions. We know that firms delay
acquisitions during high policy uncertainty periods because these investments are difficult to reverse.

Following Brown and Warner (1985), we use a market model to obtain CAR. The CAR is the difference between the
return observed in the market and the return expected from the value-weighted market model. We estimate parameters
of the market model over a 225-day range starting 31 calendar days before the event. MacKinlay (1997) provides details
of this the event study method. Our results are robust if we use the equally weighted index.
15
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We also know that investments involved in strategic alliances are significantly smaller and staggered.
So, if investment irreversibility is the only factor at play, then one would expect an increase in policy
uncertainty to have a relatively weaker impact on alliance formations vis-à-vis the previously
documented effect on acquisitions. If, however, both investment irreversibility and relational risk are
at play, then the net effect of policy uncertainty increase on strategic alliances may be equally strong
or stronger vis-à-vis acquisitions, depending on the relative impacts of the two effects on these two
very different types of corporate capital investment deals.
Our analysis shows that the economic impact is somewhat stronger on strategic alliance
formations. Recall from our discussion in Section 4.1.2, and Figure 3, that when Policy Uncertainty
increases from 80 to 110, the probability of undertaking a strategic alliance drops by about 25%, from
5.22% to 3.92%. In contrast, an increase in Policy Uncertainty from 80 to 110 is associated with a
reduction in the probability of acquisition from 3.64% to 2.88%—a drop of about 21%, 4% smaller
than its effect on strategic alliances. In column 1 of Table 11 we report the logit regression on which
this result is based. The dependent variable in this regression is the Acquisition Dummy, which assumes
a value of one when the firm acquires at least one target and zero otherwise. 16 For brevity, we do not
report the figure as we do for the effect of policy uncertainty on strategic alliance formations. A
comparison of the coefficient of Policy Uncertainty in column 1 of Panel A of Table 3 and column 1 of
Panel A of Table 8 shows that they are statistically different with a p-value of 0.033. This p-value is
based on a two-tailed t-test that compares the coefficient and standard error of Policy Uncertainty in
Column 1 of Table 3 and Column 1 of Table 8. We reach the same conclusion when we compare the
coefficient of OLS regression analysis (Column 1 of Panel A of Table 4, and Column 2 of Table 11),

The mean of Acquisition Dummy is 0.07059 and the median is 0. The standard deviation is 0.18937. The filters we use to
obtain the acquisition data are similar to Moeller et al. (2004). We require that (i) acquirer controls less than 50% of the
shares of the target at the announcement date and obtains 100% of the target shares, (ii) the deal value exceeds or equals
$1 million, (iii) the transaction size is more than 1% of the value of the acquirer, and (iv) completion time is less than one
thousand days.
16
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instead of logit coefficients. A 30-point increase in policy uncertainty is associated with a 7% decrease
in the standard deviation of the Alliance Dummy ((30*-0.0005)/0.224), and with 5% decrease in the
standard deviation of Acquisition Dummy ((30*-0.0003)/ 0.18937). The p-value of a two-tailed t-test for
equality of coefficient is 0.004.
<Insert Table 11>
5. Conclusions
We contribute to the literature on corporate capital investments under policy uncertainty. Our
study suggests that relational risk is another factor, besides investment irreversibility, why firms reduce
investments during times of increased policy uncertainty. Often investments, particularly strategic
alliances, involve contracts. These contracts are typically incomplete and imperfect (Tirole 1999). Our
analysis suggests that with increase in policy uncertainty, the costs of writing and implementing these
contracts also increase as relation (counterparty) risk increases. Overall, policy uncertainty deters
investments that involve relational contract with another party, such as for strategic alliances. This is
an important contribution because an emerging strand of literature examines the effect of policy
uncertainty on investments, and the key argument, in all of these studies, has been that the investment
irreversibility feature makes it more attractive to delay investments during times of high uncertainty.
Our study shows that relation (counterparty) risk plays a dominant role in determining the
effect on strategic alliances during times of elevated policy uncertainty. As strategic alliances have
increased in prominence in recent years, the difference between the effects of policy uncertainty on
M&A and strategic alliances take on an increased significance in the literature. While our study
highlights the dominance of 'relation risk' for strategic alliances, previous studies on the effect of policy
uncertainty on M&As conclude that investment 'irreversibility’ is the primary factor playing a role in
the decline in such deals during elevated policy uncertainty regimes.
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We also find that alliances that involve greater relational risk, such as those with multiple
partners, partners with characteristics where the counterparty misbehavior is more likely, and
industries that require intense contracts, decrease to a greater extent when policy uncertainty increases.
Further, the economic impact of policy uncertainty on the likelihood of undertaking a corporate
alliance is much stronger than its effect on the likelihood of an acquisition. Lastly, we find that the
stock market reaction to strategic alliance announcements is significantly greater when they are
undertaken during enhanced policy uncertainty regimes.

35

References
Anand, B. N., and T. Khanna. 2000. Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. Strategic Management
Journal 21 (3):295-315.
Baker, S. R., N. Bloom, and S. J. Davis. 2016. Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 131 (4):1593-1636.
Barney, J. B. 1986. Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business strategy. Management Science 32
(10):1231-1241.
Battigalli, P., and G. Maggi. 2008. Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship. The RAND Journal of
Economics 39 (2):352-377.
Bonaime, A. A., H. Gulen, and M. Ion. 2018. Does Policy Uncertainty Affect Mergers and Acquisitions?
Journal of Financial Economics 129 (3):531-558.
Boone, A. L., and V. I. Ivanov. 2012. Bankruptcy spillover effects on strategic alliance partners. Journal of
Financial Economics 103 (3):551-569.
Brown, S. J., and J. B. Warner. 1985. Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. Journal of Financial
Economics 14 (1):3-31.
Çolak, G., A. Durnev, and Y. Qian. 2017. Political uncertainty and IPO activity: Evidence from US
gubernatorial elections. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 52 (6):2523-2564.
Das, T. K., and B.-S. Teng. 2001. Trust, control, and risk in strategic alliances: An integrated framework.
Organization studies 22 (2):251-283.
Devlin, G., and M. Bleackley. 1988. Strategic alliances—guidelines for success. Long Range Planning 21 (5):1823.
Dickson, P. H., and K. M. Weaver. 1997. Environmental determinants and individual-level moderators of
alliance use. Academy of Management Journal 40 (2):404-425.
Eisenhardt, K. M., and C. B. Schoonhoven. 1996. Resource-based view of strategic alliance formation:
Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms. Organization Science 7 (2):136-150.
Erramilli, M. K., and C. P. Rao. 1993. Service firms' international entry-mode choice: a modified transactioncost analysis approach. The Journal of Marketing 57 (3):19-38.
Gomes-Casseres, B., J. Hagedoorn, and A. B. Jaffe. 2006. Do alliances promote knowledge flows? Journal of
Financial Economics 80 (1):5-33.
Gottschalg, O., and M. Zollo. 2007. Interest alignment and competitive advantage. Academy of Management
Review 32 (2):418-437.
Gulati, R. 1995. Social structure and alliance formation patterns: A longitudinal analysis. Administrative Science
Quarterly 40 (4):619-652.
———. 1999. Network location and learning: The influence of network resources and firm capabilities on
alliance formation. Strategic Management Journal 20 (5):397-420.
Gulen, H., and M. Ion. 2016. Policy uncertainty and corporate investment. Review of Financial Studies 29
(3):523-564.
Harrigan, K. R. 1988. Joint ventures and competitive strategy. Strategic Management Journal 9 (2):141-158.
Kale, P., J. H. Dyer, and H. Singh. 2002. Alliance capability, stock market response, and long-term alliance
success: the role of the alliance function. Strategic Management Journal 23 (8):747-767.
Kim, H., and H. Kung. 2016. The asset redeployability channel: How uncertainty affects corporate
investment. Review of Financial Studies:hhv076.
Kim, J. W., and M. C. Higgins. 2007. Where do alliances come from?: The effects of upper echelons on
alliance formation. Research Policy 36 (4):499-514.
KPMG. 2018. Strategic alliances: a real alternative to M&A?
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ie/pdf/2018/01/ie-strategic-alliances-a-real-alternative-toma.pdf.
Krishnan, R., I. Geyskens, and J. B. E. Steenkamp. 2016. The effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based
governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental uncertainty. Strategic Management
Journal.
Kulatilaka, N., and E. C. Perotti. 1998. Strategic growth options. Management Science 44 (8):1021-1031.
36

Lin, H., and N. Darnall. 2015. Strategic alliance formation and structural configuration. Journal of Business
Ethics 127 (3):549-564.
MacKinlay, A. C. 1997. Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic Literature:13-39.
McGrath, R. G., W. J. Ferrier, and A. L. Mendelow. 2004. Real options as engines of choice and
heterogeneity. Academy of Management Review 29 (1):86-101.
Merton, R. C. 1998. Applications of Option-Pricing Theory: Twenty-Five Years Later. The American Economic
Review 88 (3):323-349.
Moeller, S. B., F. P. Schlingemann, and R. M. Stulz. 2004. Firm size and the gains from acquisitions. Journal of
Financial Economics 73 (2):201-228.
Nelson, R. R., and S. G. Winter. 2009. An evolutionary theory of economic change: Harvard University Press.
Nevin, M. M. 2014. The Strategic Alliance Handbook: A Practitioners Guide to Business-to-business Collaborations:
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Nguyen, N. H., and H. V. Phan. 2017. Policy Uncertainty and Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis 52 (2):613-644.
Nunn, N. 2007. Relationship-specificity, incomplete contracts, and the pattern of trade. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 122 (2):569-600.
Ozmel, U., D. T. Robinson, and T. E. Stuart. 2013. Strategic alliances, venture capital, and exit decisions in
early stage high-tech firms. Journal of Financial Economics 107 (3):655-670.
Pástor, Ľ., and P. Veronesi. 2013. Political uncertainty and risk premia. Journal of Financial Economics 110
(3):520-545.
Piercy, N. F., and N. Lane. 2007. Ethical and moral dilemmas associated with strategic relationships between
business-to-business buyers and sellers. Journal of Business Ethics 72 (1):87-102.
Podolny, J. M. 1994. Market uncertainty and the social character of economic exchange. Administrative Science
Quarterly 39 (3):458-483.
Robinson, D. T. 2008. Strategic Alliances and the Boundaries of the Firm. Review of Financial Studies 21 (2):649681.
Smit, H. T., and L. Trigeorgis. 2012. Strategic investment: Real options and games: Princeton University Press.
Stein, L. C., and C. C. Wang. 2016. Economic uncertainty and earnings management. Harvard Business
School https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746091.
Tian, X., and K. Ye. 2017. How Does Policy Uncertainty Affect Venture Capital? Tsinghua University - PBC
School of Finance https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2910075.
Tirole, J. 1999. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand? Econometrica 67 (4):741-781.
Ulset, S. 1996. R&D outsourcing and contractual governance: An empirical study of commercial R&D
projects. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 30 (1):63-82.
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource‐based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal 5 (2):171-180.
Williamson, O. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism Firms Markets Relational Contracting: Free Press.
Xie, X., G. Qi, and K. X. Zhu. 2019. Corruption and new product innovation: Examining firms’ ethical
dilemmas in transition economies. Journal of Business Ethics 160 (1):107-125.
Yin, X., and M. Shanley. 2008. Industry determinants of the “merger versus alliance” decision. Academy of
Management Review 33 (2):473-491.

37

Appendix A
An example of a strategic alliance
Seattle Genetics and Millennium: The Takeda Oncology Company formed an agreement to globally develop
and commercialize brentuximab vedotin, an antibody-drug conjugate that is in the late-stage clinical trials.
Seattle Genetics is a clinical stage biotechnology company and does not have experience marketing a drug
worldwide. Takeda is the largest pharmaceutical company in Japan and one of the global leaders of the industry.
Seattle Genetics benefits from the marketing experience of Takeda. Moreover, Takeda benefits by getting an
opportunity to market a drug that it did not have the expertise to develop but can market globally. The following
quote is illustrative of the mutual benefit, “Under the collaboration, Seattle Genetics will receive an upfront
payment of $60 million and retains full commercialization rights for brentuximab vedotin in the United States
and Canada. The Takeda Group will have exclusive rights to commercialize the product candidate in all
countries other than the United States and Canada. Seattle Genetics is entitled to receive progress- and salesdependent milestone payments in addition to tiered double-digit royalties based on net sales of brentuximab
vedotin within the Takeda Group's licensed territories. Milestone payments to Seattle Genetics could total more
than $230 million. Seattle Genetics and the Takeda Group will jointly fund worldwide development costs on a
50:50 basis. Development funding by the Takeda Group over the first three years of the collaboration is
expected to be at least $75 million. In Japan, the Takeda Group will be solely responsible for development
costs.”
Source: http://investor.seattlegenetics.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=124860&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1365794
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Appendix B
Variables

Descriptions

Dependent
variables
Alliance Dummy

An indicator variable that is 1 if the firm undertakes an alliance in that year, and 0
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum

No. of Alliances

The number of strategic alliances announced by the firm in the year.
Source: SDC Platinum

Acquisition Dummy

An indicator variable that is 1 if the firm undertakes an acquisition in that year, and 0
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum

CAR (-2,+2)

The five-day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of a strategic
alliance. Source: SDC Platinum & Eventus

Withdrawn

An indicator variable that is equal to one when an alliance that was already announced
is withdrawn. Source: SDC Platinum

# of Alliances in a

The difference in the number of alliances in a state with an election, and a bordering

state with election -

state without an election. Source: SDC Platinum

# of alliances in a
state without election
# of Alliances in a

The total number of alliances in the state with an election. Source: SDC Platinum

state with election
Research
Variable
Policy Uncertainty

The level of policy uncertainty. A higher value indicates higher policy uncertainty.
Source: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_monthly.html

Firm-level
control variables
Ln(assets)

The logarithm of Total Assets. Source: Compustat

Age

Year - Birth Year. Birth year is the year of IPO or the first year Compustat reports
data for the firm. Source: Compustat

Market-to-Book

The market capitalization of the firm's stock divided by the total assets of the firm.
Source: Compustat

Cash

The cash and cash equivalents of the firm divided by the total assets. Source:
Compustat
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R&D

The R&D expenditure divided by the total assets of the firm. If R&D expenditure is
missing, the value is set to zero. Source: Compustat

R&D dummy

A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the R&D expenditure for that year is
missing, and 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat

Cashflow

Earnings before income and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets. Source: Compustat

Gross margin

Sales minus cost of goods sold divided by sales. Source: Compustat

Debt-to-assets

The ratio of total liabilities and total assets. Source: Compustat

Capital

The ratio of net property plant and equipment and total assets. Source: Compustat

Sales Growth

The log of the ratio of current year sales to previous year’s sales assets. Source:
Compustat

Macroeconomic
controls
Sales growth

The cross-sectional standard deviation of the sales growth of all firms for that year.

dispersion

Source: Compustat

Real earnings

The 12-month rolling standard deviation of real earnings. Source:

volatility

http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm

Leading indicators

An index that measures the leading indicators to predict the future of the business
cycle. Source: https://www.conferenceboard.org/data/bci/chartdatagrid.cfm?cid=1&dataseries=G0M920&series=US_Series

Real earnings index

The index of the real earnings of the publicly traded firms in the U.S. Source:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm

Current economic

The economic index that measures the current economic conditions by means of

conditions

surveys: Source: http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/charts.html

CAPE Shiller

The Shiller's CAPE Index: Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm

index
BAA-Fed fund rate

The difference in the yields of the Moody's seasoned corporate BAA rated bonds and
the Fed Fund rate. Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org
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Time trend

The numerical values of the year.

Other variables
Asset Redeployable

An indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the partner in the strategic alliance has
assets redeployability score higher than the median. The scores are based on Kim and
Kung (2016).

Contract Intensive

An indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the partner in the strategic alliance is

Industry

from an industry that is among the twenty most contract intense industries. Sources:
Nunn (2007)
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Panel A: Sample selection

Appendix C

Total Compustat firm-years
Less firms not headquartered in the U.S
Less firm-years with no Total Assets and Sales data
Less firms that belong to Finance and Utility Industries
Less firm-years with missing Market-to-Book
Less firm-years without the Sales growth
Less firm-years with no PPE
Less firm-year with missing other control variables
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Observations
336,243
(42,317)
(46,385)
(56,303)
(9,490)
(8,417)
(2,625)
(589)
170,117

Panel B: Number of observations in our sample by industry
Industries
Observations
1
Agriculture
708
2
Food Products
3,155
3
Candy & Soda
593
4
Beer & Liquor
701
5
Tobacco Products
241
6
Recreation
1,585
7
Entertainment
3,347
8
Printing and Publishing
1,443
9
Consumer Goods
3,276
10
Apparel
2,472
11
Healthcare
3,848
12
Medical Equipment
6,386
13
Pharmaceutical Products
10,058
14
Chemicals
3,826
15
Rubber and Plastic Products
1,753
16
Textiles
936
17
Construction Materials
3,610
18
Construction
2,263
19
Steel Works Etc.
2,626
20
Fabricated Products
655
21
Machinery
6,013
22
Electrical Equipment
2,993
23
Automobiles and Trucks
2,893
24
Aircraft
843
25
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment
370
26
Defense
306
27
Precious Metals
941
28
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining
697
29
Coal
384
30
Petroleum and Natural Gas
8,460
31
Utilities
32
Communication
8,208
33
Personal Services
2,332
34
Business Services
25,085
35
Computers
7,772
36
Electronic Equipment
11,338
37
Measuring and Control Equipment
3,914
38
Business Supplies
2,255
39
Shipping Containers
573
40
Transportation
5,572
41
Wholesale
7,257
42
Retail
9,811
43
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels
3,949
44
Banking
45
Insurance
46
Real Estate
47
Trading
48
Not available
4,669
Total
170,117
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Alliances
41
123
46
45
3
146
207
93
176
159
166
592
1,764
205
54
31
65
49
38
14
291
151
148
66
12
13
12
11
3
210
555
66
3,287
1,347
1,166
330
70
13
206
420
440
104
49
12,987

Panel C: Number of observations, alliances and firms undertaking alliances in our sample by year
Year
Observations
Alliances
Firms Undertaking Alliances
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total

5,479
5,484
5,617
5,949
6,253
6,558
7,313
7,564
7,445
7,609
7,585
7,274
6,708
6,274
5,989
5,729
5,551
5,370
5,077
4,926
4,784
4,645
4,512
4,605
4,627
4,538
4,176
4,293
4,212
3,971
170,117

292
438
959
758
841
847
664
952
883
979
583
309
269
362
282
309
490
440
365
39
40
88
128
137
161
13
168
351
402
438
12,987
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152
251
251
445
494
532
448
610
588
630
416
237
214
296
245
264
352
344
293
40
42
82
114
123
149
12
144
301
345
376
8,790

Panel D: The frequency of the number of alliances a firm undertook in a year, if they did form at least one
alliance
The frequency of # of alliances in a year % of the sample
1
74.38%
2
15.89%
3
5.63%
4
0.21%
5
0.10%
6 or greater
3.79%
Total
100.00%

Panel E: The breakdown of alliances based on the number of partners
% of the
# of partners in Alliance
sample
1 partner
92.71%
2 partners
5.15%
3 partners
0.81%
4 partners
0.58%
5 partners
0.33%
6 or more partners
0.42%
Total
100.00%

Panel F: The number of alliances by alliance type
Alliance Type
% of Alliances
License_alliance
R&D_alliance
Funding_alliance
Manufacturing_alliance
Marketing_alliance
Supply_alliance
Not Specified
Total

Number

19.67%
17.06%
1.75%
9.42%
22.49%
4.28%
25.33%
100.00%

2,554
2,216
227
1,224
2,922
555
3,289
12,987
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the sample used in baseline logit regression

Variable
Nos. of Alliances
Alliance Dummy
Policy Uncertainty
Ln(assets)
Age
Market-to-Book
Cash
R&D
R&D dummy
EBIT
Gross margin
Debt
PPE
Sales growth
Sales growth dispersion
Real earnings volatility
Leading business cycle indicators
Real earnings index
Current economic conditions
CAPE Shiller index
BAA-Fed fund rate
Time trend

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

0.076
0.052
103.448
4.955
7.181
2.019
0.191
0.068
0.414
-0.135
-0.054
0.540
0.272
-0.005
0.950
0.024
114.399
69.566
99.140
25.555
3.864
2003.520

0.506
0.224
25.257
2.644
5.992
5.048
0.227
0.153
0.493
0.813
3.105
0.273
0.242
3.296
0.181
0.060
35.215
27.581
12.158
6.430
1.783
8.365

0.000
0.000
69.475
-2.577
0.000
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.000
-7.403
-21.825
0.027
0.000
-18.154
0.524
0.000
70.463
30.549
68.100
14.818
0.980
1990.000

36.000
1.000
164.317
11.696
67.000
59.886
0.969
1.096
1.000
0.391
0.966
1.000
0.920
18.159
1.189
0.358
252.102
134.389
114.200
40.553
8.270
2019.000
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Table 2: Correlations of the sample used in baseline regression
[1]
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]

Nos. of Alliances
Alliance Dummy
Policy Uncertainty
Ln(assets)
Age
Market-to-Book
Cash
R&D
R&D dummy
EBIT
Gross margin
Debt
PPE
Sales growth
Sales growth dispersion
Real earnings volatility
Leading business cycle indicators
Real earnings index
Current economic conditions
CAPE Shiller index
BAA-Fed fund rate
Time trend

1.00
0.66
-0.05
0.08
-0.03
0.02
0.08
0.06
-0.08
0.01
0.01
-0.04
-0.06
0.08
0.03
-0.04
-0.04
-0.02
0.05
0.03
-0.03
-0.04

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

1.00
-0.07
0.07
-0.01
0.02
0.11
0.08
-0.11
0.01
0.00
-0.06
-0.08
0.08
0.04
-0.05
-0.02
-0.01
0.08
0.05
-0.04
-0.03

1.00
0.11
0.18
-0.01
0.02
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.02
-0.02
-0.48
0.43
0.41
-0.17
-0.03
-0.72
-0.37
0.54
0.37

1.00
0.21
-0.28
-0.22
-0.3
0.05
0.43
0.17
0.01
0.19
-0.13
0.13
0.04
0.1
0.21
-0.05
0.03
0.06
0.26

1.00
-0.01
-0.04
-0.03
-0.05
0.03
0.02
0.00
-0.03
0.09
0.16
0.07
0.16
0.26
-0.11
-0.03
0.11
0.34

1.00
0.18
0.23
-0.05
-0.55
-0.18
0.04
-0.1
-0.19
0.02
-0.01
0.03
0.07
0.01
0.05
0.00
0.07

1.00
0.38
-0.26
-0.13
-0.26
-0.38
-0.39
-0.13
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.1
-0.01
0.04
0.02
0.11

1.00
-0.35
-0.43
-0.32
0.02
-0.2
-0.14
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.05

1.00
0.05
0.06
0.13
0.28
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
-0.04
0.00
-0.02
-0.01
-0.05

47

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[10]
EBIT
1.00
[11]
Gross margin
0.31 1.00
[12]
Debt
-0.22 0.02 1.00
[13]
PPE
0.07 0.06 0.14 1.00
[14]
Sales growth
0.29 0.21 0.01 0.04 1.00
Sales
growth
dispersion
[15]
0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.01 1.00
[16]
Real earnings volatility
-0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 1.00
Leading
business
cycle
indicators
[17]
-0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.1 0.00 0.31 -0.18 1.00
Real
earnings
index
[18]
-0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.5 -0.25 0.48 1.00
Current economic conditions
[19]
0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.27 -0.52 -0.1 0.24 1.00
CAPE Shiller index
[20]
-0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.00
0.2 -0.24 -0.13 0.34 0.72 1.00
BAA-Fed fund rate
[21]
-0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.15 0.37 0.18 -0.3 -0.74 -0.48 1.00
Time trend
[22]
-0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.1 0.01 0.45 0.15 0.45 0.79 -0.17 0.14 0.24 1.00
Notes on Table 2: Panel A reports the summary statistics of the sample used in the baseline regression. Panel B presents the Pearson correlations.
Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. The bolded correlations are significant at 5 percent.
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Table 3: Policy uncertainty reduces the likelihood that a firm will undertake a strategic alliance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent Variable = Alliance Dummy
Policy Uncertainty
Ln(assets)
Age
Market-to-Book
Cash
R&D
R&D dummy
EBIT
Gross margin
Debt
PPE
Sales growth

-0.0102
(-12.1137)***
0.2917
(27.4043) ***
-0.0071
(-2.9569) ***
0.0193
(8.1741) ***
0.7842
(7.8116) ***
1.2351
(9.7734) ***
-0.5499
(-10.8023) ***
-0.0442
(-1.3923)
0.0230
(5.3492) ***
-0.3279
(-3.667) ***
-0.7154
(-6.4361) ***
0.0129
(2.6584) ***

-0.0148
(-14.2131) ***
0.2353
(10.3696) ***
-0.0175
(-3.2946) ***
0.0178
(6.6995) ***
0.6199
(5.7444) ***
1.1911
(10.4490) ***
-0.5478
(-10.7221) ***
-0.0123
(-0.3130)
0.0197
(4.5491) ***
-0.3696
(-3.509) ***
-0.3265
(-1.9577) *
0.0285
(3.5780) ***
49

-0.0124
(-14.1993) ***

-0.0101
(-5.1096)***
0.2031
(0.0085)
-0.0220
(-0.0035)
0.0130
(0.0116)
0.1509
(0.0148)
0.2544
(0.0057)
-0.1699
(-0.1204)
-0.0176
(-0.0006)
0.0017
(0.0033)
-0.2015
(-0.005)
-0.0411
(-0.0003)
0.0006
(0.0001)

Sales growth dispersion
Real earnings volatility
Leading_indicators
Real_earnings
Current_economic_conditions
CAPE Shiller index
BAA-Fed fund rate
Time trend
Firm Fixed Effects
Inds. fixed effect
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
N
Groups

0.0000
(2.1575) **
-6.3197
(-2.481) **
0.0033
(1.3323)
-0.0185
(-1.5513)
0.0082
(0.4302)
0.0020
(0.1082)
-0.0402
(-0.4288)
-0.0101
(-0.2667)
No
Yes
4,104.6865
0.1342
170,117

0.0000
(0.0504)
-7.0413
(-0.004)
0.0041
(0.0058)
0.0029
(0.0009)
-0.0208
(-0.0017)
0.0065
(0.0016)
-0.0039
(-0.0022)
-0.0581
(-0.0009)

No
Yes
3,734.2515
0.1013
170,117

No
Yes
890.5402
0.0626
170,117

Yes
No
1,237.9218
0.1366
59,617
4,015

Notes on Table 3: This table reports the logit coefficients. Alliance Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes a
strategic alliance and 0 otherwise. Policy Uncertainty measures the extent of policy uncertainty. The industry fixed effects are based on Fama and French’s
48 industry grouping. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. In parentheses are the t-statistics based on standard errors based on double cluster
by firm and year for all coefficients except those reported in column 4 where the t-statics are based on clustering by year. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Robustness of baseline results
Panel A: The main results are robust when using OLS, or when using the number of alliances undertaken as a dependent variable
(1)
(2)

(3)

DV= Alliance Dummy

DV= Number of Alliances

DV= Number of Alliances

OLS

OLS

Negative Binomial

-0.0005

-0.0008

-0.0091

(-5.1942)***

(-7.5361)***

(- 8.8158)***

Firm-level controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Macro economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time trend

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R-squared

0.0616

0.0525

N

170,117

170,117

Policy Uncertainty

Wald Chi2

3,9081.4213

Groups

170,117
18,165
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Panel B: Main results are robust when we analyze different subsamples based on the type of alliance
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

Subsample =

Subsample =

Subsample =

Marketing alliance

R&D alliance

Funding alliance

Dependent Variable = Alliance Dummy
Subsample=

Subsample =

Supply alliance

License alliance

-0.0140

-0.0200

-0.0150

-0.0183

-0.0221

-0.0507

(-5.0389)***

(-3.8165) ***

(-1.9657) **

(-3.6207) ***

(-4.7418) ***

(-3.1022)***

Firm controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Macro controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Trend

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,056.5627

2,472.0139

1,035.0069

1,964.7006

2,409.8943

1,6425.8355

Pseudo.- R Sqd

0.1599

0.1372

0.1490

0.1588

0.1948

0.1579

N

170,117

170,117

170,117

170,117

170,117

170,117

Policy Uncertainty

Wald Chi2

Subsample =
Manufacturing
alliance
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Panel C: Robustness test using individual components of policy uncertainty index
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent Variable = Alliance Dummy
News component

-0.0053
(-7.7942) ***

Government Spend. component

-0.0005
(-3.1441) ***

CPI component

-0.0074
(-8.7813) ***

Tax component

Firm-level controls
Macro economic controls
Time Trend
Industry fixed effect

-0.0002
(-2.5586) **
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Wald Chi2
4,105.2211
3,657.2910
4,037.1039
3,801.2180
Pseudo R-squared
0.1312
0.1367
0.1317
0.1218
N
170,117
170,117
170,117
170,117
Notes on Table 4: The results of Panel A indicate that the main results continue to hold when we use OLS instead of logit, and when we use No. of
Alliances, the number of strategic alliances in a firm-year, as the dependent variable. Panel B reports the results of subsamples of different types of the
alliance. Panel C reports the results when we use the individual components of policy uncertainty that is used to construct the overall policy uncertainty
index. Alliance Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes a strategic alliance and 0 otherwise. Firm-level controls,
Macro-economic controls, and Time trend represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the
t-statistics based on standard errors based on double clustering by firm and year for all coefficients except those reported in and Panel A’s column 3 where
the t-statics are based on clustering by year.
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Table 5 Difference-in-differences test
Panel A: Baseline test
(1)

(2)

Dependent variable = # of Alliances in a state with election - # of alliances in
a state without election
-0.0054
(-1.9304)*

Election Year
Δ Lag Alliances
Δ Lag GDP/Capita Growth
Δ Lag Unemployment Rate
Year fixed effects
Adj R-squared
N

Yes
0.1384
618

54

-0.0558
(-4.0012)***
0.0023
(7.013)***
-0.0000
(-1.472)
-0.0047
(-4.143)***
Yes
0.2561
618

Panel B: Difference-in-differences results for high versus low uncertainty elections
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Sample
Dependent variable = # of Alliances in a state with election- # of alliances in a state without election
Governor Change
Yes
No

Election Year
Δ Lag Alliances
Δ Lag GDP/Capita Growth
Δ Lag Unemployment Rate
Year fixed effects
Adj R-squared
N

-0.0696
(-3.1615)***
0.0016
(3.2532)***
-0.0000
(-0.1456)
-0.0039
(-1.4925)
Yes
0.3578
209

Incumbent Governor
Yes
No

-0.0061
(-0.2422)
0.0021
(4.8517)***
-0.0000
(-1.072)
-0.0062
(-3.6221)***
Yes
0.3169
409
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-0.0567
(2.9403)***
0.0011
( 2.0750)**
-0.0000
(-1.9875)**
-0.0047
(-1.8919)*
Yes
0.3436
204

-0.0166
(-0.6858)
0.0015
(3.8516)***
-0.0000
(-2.1721)**
-0.0072
( -4.3629)***
Yes
0.3026
414

Close Election
Yes
No
-0 .04635
(-2.0312)**
0.0015
(5.0117)***
-0.0000
(-2.3203)**
-0.0016
(-2.0781)**
Yes
0.3328
309

-0.0186
(-0.2114)
0.0011
(5.0730)***
-0.0000
(0.8729)
-0.0012
(-1.8318)*
Yes
0.3257
309

Panel C: Corporate alliances before and after an election
(1)
Dependent variable = # of Alliances in a state with election

Election Year (T= +1)

0.0042
(2.5922)**
Post-Election Year (T= +2)
0.0021
(2.0321)**
Pre-Election Year (T= -1)
-0.0004
( -0.8924)
Lag Alliances
0.0005
(2.5806)**
Lag GDP/Capita Growth
-0.0002
( -0.5618)
Lag Unemployment Rate
-0.0012
(-1.5434)
Lag S&P 500 Returns
0.0002
(2.2015)**
Lag Interest Rate
0.0021
(2.2427)**
State fixed effects
Yes
Adj R-squared
0.6218
N
618
Notes on Table 5: Panel A of this table reports the difference-in-difference test. The dependent variable is the difference in the number of alliances in a
state with an election, and a bordering state without an election. Δ Lag Alliances is the difference in the number of alliances last year. Δ Lag GDP/capita
Growth is the difference in the GDP growth, Δ Lag Unemployment Rate is the lag of the difference in the unemployment rate between the two states. Panel
B reports the test of Column 2 in Panel A, but by separating the sample into by whether the elections involved high uncertainty or low uncertainty. The
measures for the uncertainty of the election is whether there was a change in governor, whether the incumbent governor was running for election, and
whether the election was close. High uncertainty elections are ones where the governor changes or the incumbent governor was not running, or the
victory margin was less than the median. Panel C reports the results when the dependent variable is # of Alliances in a state with election, the total number in
the state with an election. In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors based on double clustering by state and year. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Does increased policy uncertainty affect alliance formations because of relational risk?
Panel A: During politically uncertain times firms prefer an alliance with fewer partners

(1)

(2)

(3)

Dependent variable = More than two partners in alliance
Policy Uncertainty

Firm-level controls
Macro-controls
Time trend
Industry Fixed Effects
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R-squared
N

-0.0019
(-1.9827)**

-0.0069
(-4.4705)***

-0.0038
(-2.6216)***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
Yes

379.9759
0.0515
8,387

176.1935
0.0293
8,387

6.8718
0.0105
8,387
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Panel B: High policy uncertainty is associated with fewer strategic alliances undertaken when the partner is research intensive

(1)

(2)

Subsample=

Policy Uncertainty

Subsample=

Partner with R&D expenditure

Partner without R&D expenditure

All Firms

-0.0154
(-12.4746)***

-0.0079
(-9.4103)***

-0.0084
(-9.1708)***
-0.0081
(3.8322)***
0.0097
(5.5537)***

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3,803.9519
0.1411
166,601

3,426.7055
0.0907
164,843

4,907.9793
0.2142
170,117

Policy Uncertainty*High Partner R&D
High Partner R&D

Firm-level controls
Macro economic controls
Time Trend
P-value of test for equality of the
coefficients of Policy Uncertainty
Industry fixed effect
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R-squared
N

(3)

0.0014
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Panel C: High policy uncertainty is associated with fewer strategic alliances undertaken in services industries

(1)

(2)

(3)

DV= Alliance Dummy

Policy Uncertainty

Subsample =
Services
-0.0150
(-7.6967)***

Subsample =
All Industries except Services
-0.0085
(-3.2561)***

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4,023.1186
0.1328
153,574

3,714.0563
0.1026
157,772

5,018.1032
0.1933
160,059

Policy Uncertainty*Services
Services

Firm-level controls
Macro economic controls
Time Trend
P-value of test for equality of
the coeff. of Policy Uncertainty
Industry fixed effect
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R-squared
N

All Firms
-0.0101
(-13.0022)***
-0.0134
(-3.1153)***
0.0084
(8.8136)***

0.0001
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Panel D: High policy uncertainty is associated with fewer strategic alliances undertaken in contract intensive industries

(1)
Subsample =
Most Contract Intensive
Industries
Policy Uncertainty

(2)

Dependent Variable = Alliance Dummy
Subsample =
Subsample =
Least Contract Intensive
Most + Least Contract Intensive
Industries
Industries

-0.0122
(-3.5892)***

-0.0038
(-0.8336)

Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive
Industry

P-value of test for equality of the
coeff. of Policy Uncertainty
Industry fixed effect
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R-squared
N

-0.0115
(-4.3771)***
-1.0005
(-3.0776)***
0.6179
(1.5972)

Contract Intensive Industry

Firm-level controls
Macro economic controls
Time Trend

(3)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3,847.7612
0.1126
162,005

3748.4846
0.1071
158,108

4,034.8214
0.1108
170,117

0.0308
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Notes on Table 6: This table consists of four panels. This table reports the logit coefficients. Alliance Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 1 if the firm undertakes a strategic alliance and 0 otherwise. Policy Uncertainty measures the extent of policy uncertainty. Firm-level controls, Macroeconomic controls, and Time trend represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the p-values
based on standard errors based on double clustering—by firm and year. Panel A shows that a firm is less likely to undertake a strategic alliance with
multiple partners during politically uncertain times. More than two partner in alliance takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes an alliance with multiple
partners, rather than only one partner. The sample includes firms that formed an alliance. Panel B shows that the negative effect of Policy Uncertainty on
the undertaking of strategic alliances is much stronger when the partner is research-intensive, compared to the rest. High Partner R&D is equal to 1 when
the partner in the alliance reports R&D expenditure and 0 otherwise. Panel C shows that the negative effect of Policy Uncertainty on the undertaking of
strategic alliances is much stronger for firms that belong to service industries, compared to the rest. In service industries, the likelihood of managerial
opportunism is higher. Services is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the partner belongs to the household or business services (Fama French
industry codes 33 and 34). Panel D shows that the negative effect of Policy Uncertainty on the undertaking of strategic alliances is much stronger when the
partner belongs to an industry that requires more intense contracting. In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors based on double
clustering by firm and year. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Does policy uncertainty affect alliance formation because it is optimal to delay irreversible investments?
Panel A: The effect of policy uncertainty on strategic alliances is not stronger when alliances are more irreversible

(1)

(2)
DV= Alliance Dummy
Subsample =

Subsample =

Policy Uncertainty

Manufacturing+Supply+Funding

-0.0103
(-8.8702)***

-0.0209
(-9.2501)***

-0.0077
(-9.5586)***
0.0096
(1.0289)
-3.7349
(-1.9337)*

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
2,534.6412
0.1608
160,354

Yes
3,438.3607
0.1672
170,117

License+Marketing

P-value of test for equality of the
coefficients of Policy Uncertainty
Industry fixed effect
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R-squared
N

All Firms

License+Marketing

Policy Uncertainty*License+Marketing

Firm-level controls
Macro economic controls
Time Trend

(3)

0.7106

Yes
2,369.6088
0.1531
162,499
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Panel B: Irreversibility of investment does not moderate the effect of policy uncertainty on strategic alliances

(1)

(2)

(3)

DV= Alliance Dummy

Policy Uncertainty

Subsample =
High Asset Redeployability

Subsample =
Low Asset Redeployability

-0.0118
(-9.4827)***

-0.0094
(-7.4574)***

-0.0088
(-7.2315)***
-0.0018
(-0.5769)
0.6578
(4.3857)***

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
283.6180
0.0703
86,703

Yes
894.2273
0.0912
170,117

Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable
Asset Redeployable

Firm-level controls
Macro economic controls
Time Trend
P-value of test for equality of
the coefficients of Policy
Uncertainty
Industry fixed effect
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R-squared
N

All firms

0.3573

Yes
520.4931
0.0927
83,414
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Notes on Table 7: This table reports the logit coefficients. Alliance Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes a
strategic alliance and 0 otherwise. Policy Uncertainty measures the extent of policy uncertainty. Firm-level controls, Macro-economic controls and Time
trend represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the p-values based on standard errors
based on double clustering—by firm and year. Panel A shows the effect of Policy Uncertainty on the formation of strategic alliances for two different
subsamples. A subsample of alliance type that has less sunk costs (License & Marketing), and one with greater sunk cost (Manufacturing, Supply &
Funding). In Panel B, column 1 reports the results of the subsample of firm-years where the partner belongs to industries whose assets redeployability
score is above the median. Column 2 reports the results of the subsample of firm-years where the partner belongs to industries whose assets redeployability
score is below the median. Column 3 reports the results of a pooled analysis. In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors based on
double clustering, by firm and year.
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Table 8: Policy uncertainty’s effect on undertaking acquisitions
Panel A: Is the effect of increased policy uncertainty on acquisitions much stronger when the target belongs to an industry involving high contract
intensity?
(1)
(2)
(3)
Dependent variable = Acquisition Dummy

Policy Uncertainty

Subsample =
Most Contract Intensive Industries

Subsample =
Least Contract Intensive Industries

Subsample =
Most + Least Contract Intensive Industries

-0.012
(-3.0584)***

-0.0105
(-2.8242)***

-0.0078
(-3.3681)***
-0.0032
(-1.4582)

Policy Uncertainty*
Contract Intensive Industry
Contract Intensive Industry

0.4416
(1.8583)*

Firm-level controls
Macro-economic
controls
Time Trend

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

P-value of test for
equality of the
coefficients of Policy
Uncertainty

0.5294

Industry fixed effects
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R-squared
N

Yes
1920.0537
0.0817
162,005

Yes
1862.9732
0.0545
158,108

Yes
2,200.8463
0.0508
170,117
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Panel B: Is the effect of policy uncertainty on acquisitions much stronger when the target belongs to an industry involving high asset redeployability?
(1)
(2)
(3)
Dependent variable= Acquisition Dummy
Subsample =

Subsample =

Asset Redeployable =1
Policy Uncertainty

Subsample =

Asset Redeployable =0 Asset Redeployable =1, 0

-0.0079

-0.0117

-0.0121

(-5.6326)***

(-7.8423)***

(-7.6870)***

Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable

0.0036
(2.7467)***

Asset Redeployable

-0.2287
(-1.0321)

Firm-level controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Macro-economic controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Trend

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

157.7305

231.1136

360.864

Pseudo R-squared

0.0612

0.0742

0.0586

N

83,414

86,703

170,117

P-value of test for equality of
the coefficients of Policy
Uncertainty
Industry fixed effect
Wald Chi2

0.0148
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Panel C: The relative impact of relational risk and investment irreversibility on corporate alliances versus acquisitions
(1)

(2)

DV = Acquisition Dummy

DV = Alliance Dummy

-0.0119

-0.0131

(-3.0835)***

(-3.3793)***

-0.0006

-0.0037

(-0.0616)

(3.2090)***

0.2842

0.4679

(0.2707)

(0.2541)

0.0028

-0.0047

(2.0721)**

(-1.1774)

-0.1685

0.8027

(-0.3641)

(2.0312)**

Firm-level controls

Yes

Yes

Macro-economic controls

Yes

Yes

Time trend

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed effect

Yes

Yes

2233.4917

4146.2445

Pseudo R-squared

0.0603

0.1149

N

170,117

170,117

Policy Uncertainty
Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry
Contract Intensive Industry
Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable
Asset Redeployable

Wald Chi2
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Notes on Table 8: In column 1 of Panel A, the subsample includes only those acquisitions with partners in most contract intensive industries. In column
2 the subsample includes only those acquisitions with partners in the least contract intensive industries. The information on the intensity of the contract
is obtained from Nunn (2007). Column 3 reports the results of a pooled analysis. Contract Intensive Industry is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 when
the partner belongs to an industry ranked among top-twenty contract and 0 otherwise. The information on contract intensity is obtained from Nunn
(2007). Panel B reports the logit coefficients. It shows that Policy Uncertainty has a weaker effect on the likelihood of acquisition when the target belongs
to an industry with high asset redeployability. In column 1 the subsample includes only those acquisitions where the target’s assets redeployability was
more than the median, and in column 2 the subsample includes only those acquisitions where the target’s asset redeployability is below the median. In
Panel C, we also report the logit results when Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry and Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable are included in the same
regression. Firm-level controls, Macro-economic controls and Time trend represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3,
Column 1). In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors based on double clustering, by firm and year.
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Table 9: When policy uncertainty is high, firms are more likely to withdraw from an alliance
Panel A: Univariate tests
High Policy Uncertainty Low Policy Uncertainty
(1)-(2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Withdrawn
0.032
0.027
0.005

t-stat
(4)
5.764

p-value
(5)
(0.000)

Panel B: Multivariate tests

(1)

(2)

(3)

Dependent Variable = Withdrawn
Policy Uncertainty

Firm-level controls
Macro-controls
Time trend
Industry Fixed effect
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R-squared
N

0.0008
(0.2168)

0.0020
(2.1825)**

0.0048
(5.2959)***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
Yes

1,188.67
0.2134
12,531

330.95
0.1239
12,531

28.05
0.0704
12,531

Notes on Table 9: The variable Withdrawn takes the value of 1 if an alliance that was announced is broken off. Panel A presents the univariate analysis.
High Policy Uncertainty represents the period when policy uncertainty was greater than the median. Low Policy Uncertainty represents the period when
policy uncertainty is lower than the median. Panel B presents the multivariate results. Firm-level controls, Macro-economic controls and Time trend
represent the control variable that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors
based on double clustering, by firm and year.
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Table 10: Stock market reaction to announcement of strategic alliances is higher when policy uncertainty is high
Panel A: Univariate Analysis

CAR[-1,1]
CAR[-2,2]

High Policy Uncertainty
(1)
0.0113
0.0118

Low Policy Uncertainty
(2)
0.0082
0.0089

(1)-(2)
(3)
0.0031
0.0029

t-stat
(4)
2.0717
1.9741

p-value
(5)
0.0192**
0.0463 **

Panel B: Multivariate Analysis

Policy Uncertainty

(1)
DV= CAR(-1,+1)

(2)
DV= CAR(-2,+2)

(3)
DV= CAR(-1,+1)

(4)
DV= CAR(-2,+2)

0.0001
(2.3721)**

0.0003
(2.6265)***

0.0002
(2.5276)**

0.0005
(2.9794)***

0.0454
(3.5259)***

0.0424
(3.1138)***

CAR[-30,-3]

Firm-level controls
Macro economic controls
Time Trend

Adjusted R-squared
N

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

0.0171
12,987

0.0314
12,987

0.0425
12,987

0.0495
12,987

Notes on Table 10: This table shows that the cumulative abnormal returns of the strategic alliances that were undertaken during politically uncertain
times are higher. CAR [-1, 1] and CAR [-2, 2] represents the cumulative abnormal returns for 3 day and 5 day windows. Panel A presents the univariate
analysis. High Policy Uncertainty represents the period when policy uncertainty was greater than the median. Low Policy Uncertainty represents the period
when policy uncertainty is lower than the median. Panel B presents the multivariate results. Firm-level controls, Macro-economic controls and Time trend
represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the t-statistics based on standard errors based
on double clustering—by firm and year.
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Table 11: Acquisition and policy uncertainty
(1)

(2)

DV= Acquisition Dummy

DV= Acquisition Dummy

Logit

OLS

-0.0078

-0.0003

(-5.9893)***

(-3.4114)***

Firm-level controls

Yes

Yes

Macro-economic controls

Yes

Yes

Time Trend

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Policy Uncertainty

Wald Chi2
(Pseudo) R-squared

1964.1404
0.0461

0.0123

N
170,117
170,117
Notes on Table 11: This reports the results of regression analysis when the dependent variable is Acquisition
Dummy, and indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the firm acquires a target. Policy Uncertainty measures the
extent of policy uncertainty. Column 1 reports logit coefficients, column 2 reports the OLS results. Firm-level
controls, Macro-economic controls and Time trend represent the control variables that we use in our main
model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the t-statistics based on standard errors based on double
clustering—by firm and year.
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Figure 1
A graphical representation of policy uncertainty and the number of alliances during the sample
period
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Notes on Figure 1: This figure plots the 12 months rolling sum of the total number of alliances and the 12
months rolling average of policy uncertainty for every month from January 1990 onwards up to December
2019.
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Figure 2
Policy uncertainty and strategic alliances undertaken

Mean of Alliance Dummy
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Notes on Figure 2: This figure presents the mean of Alliance Dummy for a subsample that has policy uncertainty
below the median and another subsample that has uncertainty above the median. Alliance Dummy is an indicator
variable that is one if the firm undertakes an alliance in that year, and 0 otherwise. A two-tailed t-test shows
that the difference is statistically significant with p-value < 0.001 percent. The t-statistics for t-test is 21.556.
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Figure 3: The probability of undertaking an alliance with increasing policy uncertainty

Notes on Figure 3: The figure plots the probability of undertaking an alliance based on the base line logit
analysis specified in column 1 of Table 3.
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